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ISSUES OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS' 
Kurt C. Dopfer 
Comparative Economic Systems as a field of study has always been a 
controvers阻lsubject It emerged as a distinct field of study with the 
crys回llizationof a new economic system m the Soviet Union, and was as 
such burdened from the very beginning with the Eastern-Western-Con 
frontat10n. It is the main concern of the contributions under review to bring 
some fresh air mto the ideologICally dusty categories, emphasizing a 
“neutral”，“economic”，“theoretical”，“methodological＇’，and“analytical” 
approach focusmg on three topics which constitute the main p町田 ofthe 
book. Part I，“Analytical Framework for the Comparison of Economic 
System'', Part I, ''Alternative Approaches to the Comparison of Economic 
Systems", and Part II, "Some Environmental Variables and System 
Characteristics". The volume provides ample proof that the mere 
“theoretical，’ ISSues are not les controversial than the “trad1t1onal”one洛
As a matter of fact, there IS not even consensus when considering the general 
approaches in future research in the 自eldof Comparative Economic Systems. 
For instance, the first part bears witness of the fact that we hardly left the 
stage of definitions and general methodological considerations when it comes 
to the analysis and compa口sonsof economic systems, while the fmal part 
（“An Integration”） leaves us with the recommendation that we best 
concentrate our efforts on sectoral studies since we are eqmpped with a 
substantial body of“system-focused" literature There are other more 
'Comp,,ison of Economic Systems, Theoretical and Methodological Approaches; 
edited by Alexander Eckstein, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London 1971. 
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specific controversies; the one between GERSCHEr、IKRONand HIRSCHMAN, or 
the one between BERGSON and DOMAR Where differences in opimons on 
mere methodological questions are stil found to be so broad, a theoretical 
reconsideration of the sub1ect makes sense. The book, in short, IS timely. 
The point of departure is the comprehenSive analytical framework by 
TJALLING KOOPMANS and JOHN MONTIAS which provides a basis for 
descnption and comparisons of economic systems. The authors mtroduce the 
analytical cate且oriesenvironment, e, (economic) system，人 outcome,o, 
policies pursued by the participants of the system s, p, o IS defined as“al 
aspects or consequences of system, policy, deciSions, or actions to which 
pos山veor negative value IS attached in at least one of the norms enterin呂
田toa comparison" (p 41) A norm 1s defined as "an evaluation function of 
al outcomes that represents the preferences held by some individual or group 
pertinent to the comparison" {p 41). The question then of interest is what 
performance, say, model A shows with regard to its outcome, o, or 
preferences n(o), under the given s, e, and p,. to be expressed m, for 
instance, the relationship 
。~f (e, s, p,), or 
n(o)= n ( f(e, s, p_,). 
It is to be noted that s or p, Itself can go into the norm if value is attached to 
this variable {p 41) The authors, thus, allow for an evaluation of the 
outcome of economic systems also on the grounds of ideological-political 
norms av01ding carefully any lopsided "new" approach which would exclude 
these norms. The authors introduce the concept of the “prevailing norm” 
which tends to favor litle or nor change and “desiderata”which favor a 
vanety of change {pp. 42 48), similar to the distinction introduced earlier by 
this reviewer between the relatively stable "normative Grundentscheid”and 
the changeable “wirtschaftspolitische Zielkonzept10n＇’（ Ost-West-
Konvergenz, 1970). 
Since o mcludes s itself the formula should also serve as a formal basis for 
explaining "system changes”as indicated in chapter 3 (p. 48）ー However,
only part of s s which became a desideratum because it IS attached to a 
normー isincluded in o. However, it is empirically evident that not every 
system change IS deliberately stated as a desideratum and thus attached to a 
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norm. A variety of system changes is caused by changes in e, for intance, by 
technology without inducing desiderata changes. Such system chang田 canbe 
stated as deSideratum, but there 1s no inherent necessity to do so in al 
instances To comprise the entirety of relevant system changes, o has to be 
redefined as being open to "wanted”changes, to value attached outcomes, 
as defined by the authors, as well as open to ＇‘unwanted”changes 
determmed solely by e. W 1th a value attached to o only 
o, ~ J (s, p,J, 
where o, stands for system change, is log1cally possible, because e itself 
cannot lead to an outcome attached to deliberately stated values. Of course, e 
also mduces system chan呂田， although it is not included explicitly in the 
above relationship, but it does so here only over changing s and p, so that 
we may write 
so that we get 
S’ ~I I e ),
p; = g (e), 
o; =h (s・,p;) 
where o主standsfor outcome in system changes sens山veto changes in s’and 
p’s and s’for sand p, sensitive to changes in e. Since s’and p' are in reality 
not only sensitive to changes m e, but also to changes m the value systems of 
the mdividuals expressed m 
o, = J (s, p,), 
we have to supplement e by a normative factor, (including variables related to 
action based on value systems as well as on scientific knowledge) determined 
solely by the behavior of mdividuals, let us cal uιWe then get 
and 
s" = f {e, i), 
ρ；＝ g (e, i), 
。；＝ h (s", P',), 
where o" stands for outcome in system changes senSitive to changes m s”，
p",, ands" and p", for sand p, sensiuve to changes in e and i This 
relationship is, however, stil biased, since we excluded e as an autonomous 
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variable causing system changes; e becomes revelant only over s and p, 
which m reality can hardly ever be thought of as not being determmed by 
values of mdiv1duals, as expressed m i. The e which causes changes m s is
always related to an sand p, which comprises both e and i, integrated m the 
entities, sand p,. e has to accept the changes m i,and it ts thts mterrelattonsh1p 
which constitutes a system change, e as an autonomous vanable is excluded 
The autonomous variable, "• may occur in two ways. F1rst, a change of e 
leads to a change in o,w1thout changing sand p, This occurs only when the 
content of s, -s being by definition a form品lpnnc1pleー ischanged, but not 
the formal principle spelled out in s ischanged The materialization of a 
system prin口ple,Sm', (for mstance, consumer sovereignty) is different in 
vanous phases dependmg on the r田pectivestate of the environment e, (for 
mstance, on the actual level of per capita income）旧 whichSm isreahzed. 
Smce changes in e m these cases do not cal for formal system changes, 
these changes are left out m the relattonsh1p 
o", ~ h (s; p;), 
There ts a tendency to exclude the material aspect of s and analyze or 
compare only the formal aspect of s. It ts clear that the reductton to one of 
the two aspec包 cmlead to biased results when analyzing actual economic 
systems. What does 1t mean to have a market system working under the 
conditions of an economically les developed country as compared to a market 
system working under the conditions of an mdustnalezed country? Are the 
differences of their economic systems reflected solely by differences in the 
principles of system which are applied in these economies, or are there 
differences m their economic systems even if in bo出cases出esame p口n口ples 
of system are realized, but their environments are different? How can we 
deal theoretically with these questions? 
The second issue poses les analytical problems・ e determines s, e’G 
Although the system change occurs here via changing s, s; is completely 
determined by s,,so that we have 
s; ~ f (s,), 
p, ・= g (s,), 
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thus 
"' = h (s,) 
and since 
s, = i (e) 
we have 
o, = k {e). 
A possible version of this theoretical explanation of system changes is MARX’s 
H1storischer matenalismus. A look at this relat10nship reveals that the 
methodological fallacy 1s now the other way around. The first methodological 
fallacy was 
o, =I (s, p,), 
the second is 
Os = g {e). 
This difference, indeed, reflects the baSic difference in the approaches of 
Eastern and Western economists when dealing with economic systems. It is 
not our purpose to discuss here which theory of system changes is adequate 
We are concerned here only with the analytical framework to serve as a basIS 
for formulatmg such theories. For such a purpose, e ~must - as long as 1t 1s 
theoretically relevant be mcluded as a vanable 
Each analytical framework IS tailored for a theory, and as such it carries the 
ideas for a possible yet unarticulated theory with it. There is some mdication 
that the methodological framework KOOPMANS and MONTIAS develop IS based 
on a theoretical conception revolvmg around the individual, i, as central 
actor determing outcomes, o, in economic systems (where・ o, IS one among 
many posSible outcome categories). o,is understood by the authors m both 
cases - total system change (change of prevailing norm) and evolutionary 
change (change of desiderata）一向beingdetermined by i (p. 48・50),thus we 
have the relationship 
。”， =I Is”，P',). 
If we want to avoid a monistlc idealistic assumption, then we have to mclude 
e and e 'a as system variables expressed m the relationship 
148 
o"', ~ g (ea, e’a) 
Then, by including o" and oヘweget 
O ＂＞＇， ~h (S”，P”， , ea, e’a) 
which would serve as a general methodological framework for al possible 
theories formulated for o .<,
KOOPMANS and MONTIAS would probably accept this version since later in 
their paper, they provide a thorough analysis of the e-factors “We surmise 
further，’ the authors point out，“that the particular bundle of production 
act1V1ties takmg place between two successive transfer states that two systems 
have in common depends les on system characteristics than on the scale of 
the economy or of the enterprise and, given a modicum of efficiency, on the 
environment. Among pertinent environmental factors, the relative scarcities 
of aggregate basic inputs, such as labor, resources, and capital, to the 
economy as a whole are parucularly important.＇’（p. 53). From this 
statement we could easily build a bridge to a more balanced relationship 
between o and the variable as suggested above 
Professor HURWICZ’s paper is more abstract than Koom八Ns'sand 
MONTIAS’s paper, Not in analysis, but m approach His models are 
formulated as lo且icalpossibilities, not necessarily always as呂eneralizations
about reality In fact, reality, as far as e {in KOOPMANS’s and MONTIAS’s 
sense) is concerned, is excluded (p SJ), As far as behavioristic assumptions 
are concerned, they are of axiomatic nature, they do not change over time 
and space, and thus, do not disturb the lo呂tealcons1Stency when constructin且
the models. 
Specifically, HURWICZ’s paper deals with two attributes of the economic 
"adjustment process司’（asdefined in pp. 81-88）：“structure of authontyヘ
and "structure of information" The author pursues his exploration into the 
problem of determining under what circumstances these attributes should be 
labeled "centralized”or“decentralized” 
In definin且centrahzattonand decentralization with regard to the structure 
of authority, two extreme positions, the “one person center” and 
"autonomy’＇， are formally expressed In a“one-person cen阻r':a messa且e,
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m; emitted by agent i tels in the last stage (of al messages emitted by 
economtc agents), T, everyone what to do, so that we can write, (p. 88), 
b; ~ d; (mf)/orallj, 
m contradistinction to autonomy, (p. 88), 
b; = d; Im/!, 
where b stands for (paper) plan, d for the operation which transforms the 
termmal message into the (paper) plan with a "decoding function＇’（p. 85); 
the subsc口ptj stands for subordinate, the subscript for one-person center (or 
‘a呂ency”）
A further specification of the definition of centralization is provided when 
cases in wh凶 m千was"dictated＇’to umt i by other units at the precedmg 
stage of the 1terattve process are excluded. Thus, we require, (p. 89), 
that f.品（MT1;e)be "sens山veto"e '・ 
Similarly, to make the autonomy of J m即時ful,the case where mJ was 
“dictated" to jby i isexcluded, expressed in the requirement, (p. 89), 
山 t/J(my.1; e)be "sensitive to"•'· 
んfand；千 standfor‘r叫 onsefu山mcti。r (p.83) which relates the mess es of 
a given stage, here T, to their predecessors; ejand ei stands for environmen t 
for J and i, e thought of as an n-tuple of mdividual environmental components 
ei, so that e= (el，…，e勺，（p83）ー
The two requirements mentioned make the concept meaningful, however, 
they also throw light on cer阻mhmi回t10nsof the concept. As to the logic 
applied, the house is in order. With the mtroductton of the requirements we 
move one step further, from an argument of formal defimtion to a concept 
which becomes m回nmgful,for example, if M~ is dictated to i (e.g. central 
plannmg agency) at an田rlierstage of the decision making process by j (e.g. 
enterprises, labor umons, and so on) then we cannot speak of "actual" 
centralization Here, of course, we ask・ If not centralization, what else can 
it be? Decentralization? This alternative is excluded by definition, since 
b ;=di Im/!. 
Therefore, it ts to be concluded that these coses lie somewhat “between＇’ In 
fact, this is what we assume anyway: that reality never corresponds to the 
150 
two abstract extreme cases. However, from this statement we may not 
conclude that al possible cases tn theory and reality he along the lme of the 
class1fication“centralization or decentralization＇’as suggested. There is 
another pcss1bility. The requiremen回 themselveswhich are needed to make 
the dichotomous concept of centralization and decentralization‘meaningful’ 
may constitute, in their antithetical form, a new type of“structure of 
authority”： the combination of centralization and decentralization within 
one and即日meMT, M.'/ Such a combination is 蜘 gic'lfrom the point 
of view of the classification developed by HURWICZ, nevertheless, possible and 
meaningful with regard to reality. Close to such a model in its application 
comes the French Planification System which allows the government, 
enterprises, trade unions, etc. to s阻tetheir呂oalswhen formulatmg the plan. 
Whether th!S is enough empirical proof of the practical feasibility of m , jis
open to debate. It is, however, theoretically possible. Therefore, when 
formulatmg a general“structure of authority" we should mclude the 
hypotheti四alca 1；’ and with r申 rdto thεfo口nu
It is c。nee附vablethat M1 constitutes the main cha附 e削 csof an economic 
system. In such a system command and autonomy are changin呂inva口ous
stages of the iterative process, and there is, therefore, often no way and no 
purpose to find out whether or in what way or to what extent M作 being
d1c回tedby j, or M f is being die出 edby i. 
Smce M ¥ is left m the 閥均ticalno mans land, one is apt at expect 
compensation for it: Is there an urtequivocal class出cation of the 
“traditional" cases> The two extreme cases of command and autonomy, as 
expressed in the formalized relationships, can be defined and classified with 
the presented concept It becomes more difficult the more we deviate from 
the extreme models. When measuring various degrees of command and 
autonomy in an economy, we are left to a reference framework of defmit10n, 
where command economy is bemg defined as an economy which "prevails 
when there exists a set of umts constituting a hierarchy" (p. 90), leading to 
the concluS1on that an autonomy economy IS one which prevails when there 
exists no such set of units consututmg a hierarchy, but where autonomy 
prevails. Definitions hke this are rather broad so as to serve as an analytical 
tool for the classification of autonomy and command in economic systems. 
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The analytical concept gives rise to another question Let us assume a case 
where we have 50% autonomy. Where shall we strat》 Atthe command 
model or at the autonomy model》 Dependingon the chmce of the departing 
point we reach formally different conch】s1ons. On the one hand we end up 
with an economy where command prevails, but to a considerable extent 
autonomy is granted. On the other hand we end up with an economy where 
autonomy prevails, but where to a considerable extent command is used. 
The concept developed by HURWICZ implies that there is always a dichotomy’ 
command economy versus autonomous economy. A third model is not 
possible by definition. The question arises whether the logical incompatibility 
of definmg a genume‘third model' emerges merely as a comcidental outcome 
of the methodological framework, or whether the methodological framework 
itself is deliberately developed in a way to prove the logical mcons1stency of a 
九hirdmodel' 
Professor KUZNETS deals m his paper with 'S阻gesof Economic Growth as 
a System Determinant＇’（p 243-267). The central question to be asked is: 
How are Economic Systems determined by various stages of Economic 
Growth? Or, since sta呂田 ofEconomic Growth appear as sequences within 
Economic Epoch回目 How do Economic Epoches determine Economic 
Systems? Economic Epoches are defmed as "complexes of major mnovations 
in material techonology, inst山 uonalorganization, and ideology”（p. 248) 
Stages of Economic Growth，“in so far as they are economic epochs . are 
system determinants by defm1tion”（p 248). Economic Systems or 
"Systems" which are determmed accordmg to the time segment applied 
- either by Stages of Economic Growth or by Economic Epoches, are defmed 
by referring to“the long-term arrangements by which various umts w1thm 
an economic society are induced to cooperate m production, distnbut10n, and 
use of the aggregate productー includingmeans of control over productive 
factors, freedom or constraint on individual units in the existmg factor or 
goods marke白，， (p 249）ー Thequestion thus can be reformulated as how 
major innovations, mst1tut1onal and ideological factors, determine long-term 
arrangements established m an economic society. Since long-term 
arrangements of an economic so口etyare by defmit1on mstitutional factors of 
a respective society we arrive at the somewhat awkward question of how 
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institutional factors determine institutional factors. Epoches, Stages, and 
Systems can be taken as identical, as m the Historische Schule However, 
this is not what the author has in mmd smce in his framework epoches and 
sta呂田 determineeconomic systems. Therefore, we cannont avoid insisting 
on the mmimum requirement of statmg clearly the difference between both 
notions 
Further analysis focuses on the impact of the "Modern Economic Epoch＇’ 
on the "system that characterizes the world’s economic societies”（p. 249) 
In Professor KUZNETS’view, four complexes of factors characterize the 
Modern Economic Epoch, and have determmed the size and character of the 
economic systems of the "older developed countries”（p. 253) First, 
“shifts in the structure of production and in the underlymg technology led to 
much larger optimum or mmimum scales of plant and enterp口se. .＇’；
second，“the increased international tension and greater tendency toward 
ma1or conflicts associated with the spread of modern economic growth to 
more nation-states…stands in sharp contrast to the century before 九N'orld 
War I, with its Pax Britannica which is implicitly credited to the effective 
limitation of economic development …”， third, "the mcreasmg recognition 
of the respons1b1hty of the modern state . for the equality of economic 
opportunity…and for a minimum economic base . lead to the provision of 
public facilities to implement this purpose when and if the free-market private 
sector fails to do”； fourth, "the sc1ent1fic field as an increasing source of 
economic growth . （曲ak白）society reluctant to allow profit oriented, private 
enterp口seto develop r’How these fam1har complexes of determinants 
have been influencing the economic systems of the older economies 1s not m・
vesugated in detail, however, it is somewhat implicit m the following 
statement：“These four se臼 oftrends, leading to the new mdustrial state, 
the new military state, the new welfare state, and the new scientific state . 
are clearly significant variants of the free market, individual enterprise state 
The mixture of these variants may difer among the presently developed 
countries outside of the communist system and to some extent also within 
the latter" (p. 253/254). 
KUZNETS’paper brings out the need for further research m the fields of (1) 
classification of system determinants, (2) their interrelatedness, and (3) the 
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cause effect relationship between environmental variables as system determ1 
nants and economic systems. As for (1), a valuable contribu11on has been 
made in this volume by KOOPMANS and MONTIAS. 
“Ideology as a System Determmant" is taken up in the papers by 
Professors GERSCHENKRON and HIRSCHMAN (pp. 269-299). GERSCHENKRON 
makes a sharp distinction between ideology as historical manifestation and 
ideology as idea. According to GERSCHENKRON historical evidence shows that 
reality overruled ideologies, and not the. other way round Ideologies have to 
be viewed as a result of the historical proce田 ratherthan as one of the 
determmmg factors of this process. In a stimulatmg chapter on "Ideology of 
Industnaliza11on" (pp 279-283) the author points out that "St Simonism in 
France, nationalism in Germany, and Marxism m Imperial Russia can be 
justly regarded as the dominant industr凶izationideologies it seems very 
reasonable to say that such ideologies helped to clear the road for the advent 
of indust口alizauon.It is also reasonable to say th<t m some way they affected 
some features of the industnahzat1on. But it is not reasonable at al to say 
that St. Simonian socialism or Marxian socialism were the determinants of 
what was called French or RusSian capitalism.”（p 280/281). In fact, 
ideology never acted as system determinant - wllh the only excepllon m 
Soviet Russia; but there it was the concealed “power ideology", not the 
“oficial ideolo呂y,"which has to be clearly regarded as the “determinant of 
the economic system”（p. 289）.“By contrast, in capitalism where 1nteres白
of different classes produced a variety of‘true’and ‘false’ideologies it 1s 
1mposs1ble to regard any single ideology, be it true or false, as a determinant 
of the system. The course of economic development there was fashioned by a 
rich multiplicity of ideologies laissez-faire and state help, nationalism, 
various forms of socialist beliefs, feudal interests and ideas, ideas of social 
protest on the part of labor they al combined to mfluence the m回目。fthe 
complex and not very consistent en11ty that has been called the cap1阻list
system.”（p. 289). 
HIRSCHMAN’s reply“Ideology M酷k,or N田SUSShirt ”（pp 289 297) is 
an effort to put GERSCHENKRON's mam argument that ideology is determined 
by (rather than determines) the historical process from the head to the fet, 
or, as GERSCHENKRON might see it, from出efet to the head HIRSCHMAN 
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suggests that we distmgmsh between “oficial dominant or pro status quo 
ideologies (Mannheim’S Ideology), on the one hand, and msur且entor 
advocated ideologies (roughly Mannheim’s Utopia), on the other. ”（p 200) 
In Professor HIRSCHMAN’s view, the mistake of GERSCHENKRON s conclusions 
lies in the fact that his paper only dealt with either insurgent or advocate 
ideologies, such as the ment10ned French and Russian mdustrializauon 
ideologies “All these ideologies were fashioned for the purpose of either 
overthrowing or of substantially altermg the existmg order Hence during 
the period of the ideological assault there is no reason to expect the economic 
system to reflect the ideology at al.＇’（p. 291) Ideolog1es determine 
economic systems only 1£ they have the quahty of“dominant ideologies", 
"msurgent 1deolog1es" must be “partly or wholly dominant" so at to 
determine economic systems (p 292) Applying this distinction throughout 
the paper Professor HIRSCHMAN arrives at inter田tmgconclusions The 
author throws light on, for example, the distmcuon between “reform”and 
“rev oh山on＂，‘に. reform movements句p1callyrequest that a country’s 
long professed, but so far woefully unrealized, ideology be finally taken 
seriously, whereas revolutionary movements tend to be ammated by a wholly 
new ideology. One might thus say that a system frequently fmds itself in a 
position m which it faces the choice between either living up to the promises 
of 1回 ownideology or being destroyed by an insurgent ideology" (p. 295). 
There are other examples which lead al to the final conclusion・ “ideologies 
do exert influences and pressures on systems”（p. 297). 
While KUZNETS and GERSCHENKRON/HIRSCHMAN focus on the relationship 
between system variables and economic systems, BERGSON and DOMAR 
explore the effect of various variables of economic systems on the 
performance of the respective systems In particular, one ma1or aspect of 
comparative performance, namely static eff1c1ency, and, the observed 
differences m two countries, USA and USSR, are dealt with 
Professor BERGSON defines efficiency as “realization of production 
possibilities”（p 163), the more a community realizes ts production 
possibilities the more efficient is the production m this community 
Similarly, the production in an economic system A is considered as bemg 
more efficient than that of economic system B ifA realizes better than B Its 
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production possibilities. To make the efficiency of two systems comparable 
we have to introduce the assumption that the production possibilities level 
of technology and given resources related to outputs are equal at a given 
point of departure The comparative output per umt of mput of the two 
systems is referred to as the coefficient of comparative factor productivity, 
and wntten in the form 
π，，＝，γ＂＇ I "'・
where """ stands for the coefficient of comparative factor producuvity, while 
rrm and "' stand for the volume of output per umt of inpu回 relativeto that 
imphed by a“standard mix" in the systems m ands respectively (p.164) 
As to s回tisticalmeasuremen臼 apphedwhen companng the efficiency of USA 
and USSR, Professor BERGSONヨuggeststhe unconventional concept of index 
formulae of a呂田metncaggregation of mputs and an arithmetic aggregation 
of outputs, including two inputs (labor and capital) and two outputs 
(consumer and investment且oods). The conclusion Professor BERGSON 
derives from the comparative data examined is that "S。vietproductivity fals 
notably short of that of the USA and seems to do so not much les after 
generous allowance for the differential impact of causal factors other than 
efficiency”（p. 194) The “markedly inferior efficiency" of the Soviet 
economy to that of the US economy’汀strue both for the economy generally 
and for the nonfarm sector alone. Productivity in the USSR is especially low, 
however, for the economy generally＇’（p 194) The reasons mentioned as 
responsible for this fact are misallocauon of resources between the farm and 
nonfarm sectors as well as the particular low efficiency m agnculture (p. 194) 
Interpreting the“Meaning of the Results" of BERGSON’s paper Professor 
DoMAR opens his tirade of arguments with the statement that efficiency is a 
vague concept since we do not know where the "influence of non economic 
factors ends and true inefficiency begins" (p. 228) Professor BERGSON refers 
in his reply to the distinction between “material values attached to goods and 
services produced and disposed of, and non matenal values that may be 
attached to working arran且ements…”（p.23う） which would allow the 
comparison of only one of two, e g., economic efficiency. The dispute, 
however, goes beyond more or les semantic questions DO MAR argues that 
differences in economic efficiency between the USA and USSR attributed by 
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BERGSON mainly to differences in the economic systems are more plausibly 
explained by differences in the stage of economic development. "It seems to 
me that BERGSON’s calculations testi骨notso much to Soviet meffic1ency, 
however great 1t may mdeed be, but to an earlier stage of economic 
development as confirmed by the presence of 38.5 per cent of Soviet labor 
force in agriculture”（p 230) Although th!S later statement seems to 
contradict BERGSON’s theoreucal concept and conclusions in principle, the 
authors deviate mor m degree. Indeed, BERGSON mentions several times that 
factors such as "stage of economic development’＼“cultural" and “social 
context”determine, as well as the economic system applied, the efficiency of 
an economy (p 162). He 1S explainmg, e且， theslow Soviet factor 
productivity compared with that of the USA with the late start of the USSR 
towards industrializaton (p 236). However, BERGSON does not agr配 with
DO MAR’s assumption that the Soviet inefficiency as compared to the USA is 
mainly due to an earlier stage of economic development It might finally be 
satis今ingf。rboth authors to note the fcillowing concessions・ BOMAR devotes 
two elaborate chapters on the discussion of BERGSON’s comparative index 
which has to do with factor productivity or "economic efficiency" in 
BERGSON’s sense, although efficiency in this sense is lamented as being a 
vague concept. BERGSON, m turn, admits that“we may at least conclude 
that so口ahsm,as exemplified by the USSR, is markedly les efficient than 
capitalism, as exemplified by the USA, though perhaps about as efficient as 
capitalism as exemplified by Italy, a country at a broadly similar stage of 
development." (p. 239) 
The book contains three more contributions which al keep up with the 
high scholarly standards of the contribuuons mentioned in th!S review 
Professor BENJAMIN WARD focused in his paper on various approaches to 
"Orgamzation and Comparative Economics" (pp 103 133), Professor 
HERBERT S LEVINE contributed an arucle entitled “On Comparing Planned 
Economies" (pp 137-160), Professor ALEXANDER ERLICH took up m this 
paper“Eastern Approaches to a comparative Evaluation of Economic 
Systems" (pp. 301-335). The volume is introduced by the editor, Professor 
ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, (pp 1-23), and rounded of with an "Integration" by 
Professor MORRIS BORNSTEIN (pp 339-355) 
